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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case under §78-
2a-3(2) (d), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
NATURE OF H*OC£EDINGS BEIOW 
On January 6, 1989, the Third Circuit Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, Salt Lake City Department, Judge Floyd H. Gowans presiding, found 
Glenn R. Haws guilty of the Class A misdemeanor of making false statements 
to the Department of Ertployment Security (hereinafter "DES") kncwing them 
to be false, and kncwingly failing to disclose material facts to DES, to 
obtain or increase a benefit under the unemployment compensation laws of 
the State of Utah, in violation of §35-4-19(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as amended. On February 8, 1989, Judge Gowans imposed a fine of $250.00 
and sentenced Haws to a jail term of 90 days but suspended the jail term on 
certain terms of probation. Haws appeals this final order. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. What elements should the State of Utah have to establish in 
order to convict a claimant of the crime of fraudulently obtaining 
unenployment coropensation benefits? 
2. What mental state must the prosecution prove a claimant 
possessed in order to convict such claimant of the crime of fraudulently 
obtaining unemployment comopensation benefits? 
3. What evidence must the prosecution present to establish the 
presence of the requisite mental state? Is proof of what any claimant 
1 
should have kncwn sufficient to establish what the claimant charged 
actually did knew, despite such claimant's uncontroverted testimony as to 
\/diat he actually did knew? 
4. Was the evidence insufficient to establish that Haws possessed 
the required mental state, i.e., that he actually knew that he was supposed 
to report his ongoing part-time work on the bi-weekly claim cards and 
knowingly failed to do so? 
STATUTES WHOSE INIEE^ FRETATIC^ I IS DETERMINATIVE 
§35-4-19(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended: 
(a) Whoever makes a false statement or 
representation knewing it to be false or knewingly 
fails to disclose a material fact, to obtain or 
increase any benefit or other payment under this 
act or under the Unerrployment Compensation Law of 
any state or of the Federal Government, either for 
himself or for any other person, is guilty of a 
Class A misdemeanor; a fine imposed shall be not 
less than $50.00 and a penalty of imprisonment 
shall be for not longer than 60 days. Each false 
statement or representation or failure to disclose 
a material fact constitutes a separate offense. 
STATEMENT OF TEE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case arises out of an application and biweekly claim cards 
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filed by Glenn R. Haws with the Department of Employment Security 
(hereinafter "DES") in late 1986 and early 1987 to obtain unemployment 
compensation benefits. In mid-1986 Haws was working at both a full-time 
job and a part-time job. When, in September 1986 he lost his full-time 
job, he kept working at his regular part-time job. He thereafter filed an 
application for unemployment benefits. There is no dispute that even 
though at the time Haws filed this application for benefits he was still 
working part-time he was nevertheless entitled to some amount of 
unerrployment benefits for a period of twenty-six weeks. 
When Haws filed his application and biweekly claim cards for 
benefits in late 1986 and early 1987 he had the understanding, new 
admittedly mistaken, that he did not need to report his continuing work at 
his regular part-time job on the claim forms. Accordingly, in filling out 
the biweekly claim forms, he did not report his ongoing part-time work. 
Had he reported his ongoing part-time work he would have received $1,500 
less in benefits. Thus, his failure to report resulted in an overpayment 
of benefits of approximately $1,500.00. 
In September 1987, DES determined via an administrative hearing that 
Haws had received excess unenployitient benefits. DES required Haws to pay 
back all of the benefits he had received and assessed a penalty. Haws 
agreed to repay all the benefits and the penalty and began making the 
repayments. 
Approximately one year later and with Haws making the repayments, 
DES referred the matter to the Salt Lake County Attorney for prosecution 
under § 35-4-19(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
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B. THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On November 16, 1988, Rex Reeder, a DES investigator, swore out an 
information against Mr. Haws charging him with violations of §35-4-19(a), 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. (Record - 1) On December 23, 1988, 
Haws plead not guilty. 
Trial was held on January 3, 1989, before Judge Floyd H. Gowans. 
(Record-86) 
C. THE DISPOSITION IN THE COURT RETfW 
On January 6, 1989, Judge Gowans announced the decision of the 
court. Judge Gowans referred to the fact that during the process of filing 
for unemployment compensation benefits Haws had access to and was exposed 
to a booklet prepared by DES entitled "Unertployment Insurance Claimant 
Guide". Judge Gowans determined that because Haws was exposed to the 
booklet, Haws "should have had that ccxtplete understating", that is, the 
complete understanding to report his ongoing part-time work to DES. The 
court determined that Haws' exposure to the booklet should have created 
such an understanding in Haws' mind "irrespective of what any individual 
may have said to [him] during the course of [his] dealings with the 
Department". (Record-85, page 2) 
With respect to Haws7 testimony that during the process of applying 
for benefits he had had a conversation with a DES representative who had 
told him that he did not need to report his ongoing part-time work for 
Bonneville Estates on the biweekly claim cards and that Haws had acted in 
accordance with and in reliance on such instruction, the court did not make 
a specific finding: "Now, whether there was some miscxmirnunication between 
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you and this person, either on your part or her part, of course, the Court 
cannot answer." (R-85, pages 2,3) 
Thus, the Court determined that even assuming the Haws7 testimony 
about his conversation with a DES representative which resulted in his 
mistaken understanding of what he needed to report was truthful: 
"it would appear from these entries that the Court had 
read from this booklet, that it would have or should 
have been perfectly clear to you that you must report 
that information for future consideration." (R-85, page 
3) 
In effect, the Court held that the DES7 proof of what anyone 
receiving the DES booklet or reading the questions on the biweekly claim 
cards should have realized established that Haws actually did knew what to 
do and knowingly failed to do so and the Court found Haws "guilty as 
charged." (R-85, page 3) 
D. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. In late summer 1986, Glenn R. Haws lost his full-time job with 
Lawrence Construction Co. At the time he also worked part-time for 
Bonneville Estates and after he lost his full-time job he continued to work 
part-time for Bonneville Estates. (Record-86, pages 35, 48, State Exhibit 
#1, R-30) 
2. On September 30, 1986, Glenn R. Haws visited the offices of the 
Utah Department of Errployment Security to apply for unemployment 
compensation benefits. (R-86, pages 35-36, 46, State Exhibit #1, R-30) 
3. During this visit, DES gave him an application entitled "Claim 
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for Unemployment Benefits". (R-86, pages 36, 46, State Erfiibit #1, R-30) 
DES also gave Haws a computer printout which shewed that Haws was working 
part-time for Bonneville Estates. DES asked Haws if he was still working 
for Bonneville Estates and Haws indicated that he was still working there 
on a part-time basis. (R-86, pages 36, 48) 
4. Haws completed the application for benefits and gave it to DES. 
(R-86, pages 6, 13, 36, State Ex. #1, R-30) 
5. DES gave Haws a booklet entitled ''Uhenployment Insurance 
Claimant Guide". (R-86, pages 6, 13, 22, 46-47, State Exhibit #4, R-37) 
Haws read most of the booklet while he was at the Job Service office. (R-
86, page 47) 
6. DES also shewed Haws a 15 minute video presentation. (R-86, 
pages 13, 20-22, 36, 46-47). 
7. IXiring the course of watching the video, Haws became confused 
as to vrtiether he needed to report his ongoing part-time work at Bonneville 
Estates on the bi-weekly claim cards. (R-86, pages 36, 37, 46-47, 48) 
8. At the end of the video, a DES r^resentative requested each 
claimant to meet for a few minutes with a DES representative for 
instructions on how to fill out the bi-weekly claim cards. When Haws' name 
was called, Haws met with a DES representative, a woman vfacm Haws remembers 
as being black and heavy set but whom Haws has since not been able to 
positively or conclusively identify. During this conversation, the DES 
representative explained hew Haws should fill out the bi-weekly claim 
cards. She mentioned that Haws was to report any earnings he had. At that 
point Haws asked the representative whether the fact that he was still 
working part-time for Bonneville Estates was considered in determining his 
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eligibility for benefits and the amount he would be receiving. The 
representative responded that it was. Haws then asked, if that was the 
case, did he still need to report that ongoing part-time work. The 
representative responded that he did not need to, which Haws understood to 
mean that because DES was aware (as evidenced by the DES cranputer printout) 
that he was still working at his part-time job, he just needed to report 
earnings from other work he obtained while seeking full-time employment. 
Haws left the DES offices with the impression that he did not need to 
report his earnings from his continuing and ongoing part-time work with 
Bonneville Estates, just any other work. (R-86, pages 20, 21, 26, 29, 37-
39, 40-43, 48, 49) 
9. For the week starting October 4, 1986, continuing through April 
11, 1987, Haws filled out bi-weekly claim cards consistent with his 
understanding. Because of his impression that he did not need to report 
his ongoing part-time work at Bonneville Estates, he did not report this 
part-time work at Bonneville Estates on the bi-weekly claim cards. The 
only exception to this pattern occurred during the week of November 1, 1986 
When Haws donated labor to help a family move. Haws reported this donated 
labor on the bi-weekly claim form. (R-86, pages 7-8, 9, 38-39, 42-43, State 
Exhibit #2, R-16-29, State Exhibit #3, R-31-32) 
10. Haws received benefits for the weeks of October 4, 1986 to 
April 11, 1987, totaling the amount of $4,728. This resulted in an 
overpayment of $1,514.00. 
11. In a hearing held on September 11, 1987, a DES hearings officer 
found that Haws had violated §35-4-5 (e), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that he had knowingly withheld material information to receive 
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benefits to which he was not entitled. (R-86, pages 16, 40, 43) 
12. The hearings officer ordered Haws to repay all benefits Haws 
actually received ($4,728.00), and imposed an overpayment penalty in an 
amount equal to the actual overpayment ($1,514.00). (R-86, pages 16, 43-44) 
13. Haws did not appeal the hearing officer7s ruling. (R-86, page 
18) 
14. Foliating receipt of the hearing officer's decision, Haws 
signed a DES Installment Agreement wherein he agreed to repay the above 
sums to DES at the rate of approximately $200.00 a month. From October 20, 
1987 to November 1988, Haws repaid approximately $1,045.98 to DES. (R-86, 
pages 5, 14, 15, 16, 17, 44, Defense Exhibit #1, R-33-36) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
To convict a claimant of the crime of unemployment fraud the 
prosecution must establish that the claimant had a specific and definite 
mens rea, i.e., that the accused made a false statement knowing it to be 
false or failed to disclose material information he knew he was supposed to 
disclose. The prosecution must prove this mens rea by more than just an 
explanation of what a reasonable claimant should have known. The 
prosecution must prove this mens rea by means other than just proof of the 
claimant's act of submitting of a false statement or the failure to 
disclose material information. The prosecution must prove that the 
claimant charged actually knew what to do and knowingly failed to do so. 
In this case, the prosecution's proof of what DES believes any 
claimant such as Haws should have known does not establish vAiat Haws 
actually did know. The evidence was insufficient to establish that Haws 
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made false statements knowing them to be false. The evidence was 
insufficient to establish that Haws knowingly failed to disclose material 
facts. Absent such evidence, the trial court's verdict cannot stand. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court 
announced a new standard to guide its review of bench trials in criminal 
cases. Prior to Walker, in criminal cases tried either to a jury or to the 
bench, the appellate court/s ability to reverse the verdict was limited to 
that narrow spectrum of cases vfliere "the evidence is so lacking and 
insubstantial that a reasonable person could not have reached that verdict 
beyond a reasonable doubt", State v. Isaacson, 704 P. 2d 555, 557 (Utah 
1985). In Walker, the Supreme Court announced that henceforth it would 
set aside the trial court's verdict in a criminal case if the verdict was 
clearly erroneous, e.g., if the clear weight of the evidence required a 
different verdict or if, in reviewing the evidence, the appellate court 
reached a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. 743 
P. 2d 191,193. The Supreme Court explained that it would find the trial 
court to have made a mistake if the trial court held an erroneous view of 
the applicable law which resulted in the conviction or if the evidence did 
not adequately support the conviction: 
It may regard a finding as clearly 
erroneous only if the finding is without 
adequate evidentiary support or induced 
by an erroneous view of the law. 
(emphasis added.) 
743 P. 2d 191, 193 (quoting Wright and Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure 
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S2585 f 1971). See also State v. Wright. 744 P.2d 315 (Utah App. 1987). 
State v. Harman, 99 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 (Utah App. 1989). 
As set forth above, the trial court apparently believed that proof 
of What any claimant such as Haws should have known together with proof of 
what Haws did satisfied the statute. As set forth belcw, the trial court's 
view or interpretation of the law was erroneous. Haws submits the trial 
court's conviction of Haws was clearly erroneous in that the trial court 
held an erroneous view of what types of evidence could establish the 
required mental state and satisfy the statute. The trial court's erroneous 
view of governing legal principles directly resulted in Haws' conviction on 
less than adequate evidence. 
II. EROSECOTION FOR THE CRIME OF UNEMPIDYMENT 
FRAUD CALLS FOR DIFFERENT ELEMENTS AND A HIGHER STANDARD 
Haws recognizes that in the civil or administrative context there is 
no requirement that the State prove a claimant's mens rea in order to find 
that the claimant committed fraud. See e.g., the DES Regulations 
interpreting §35-4-5 (e) and §35-4-6(d), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended. R-475-5e-2/ R-475-6d, Utah Administrative Code, 1987-88. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held in reviewing DES 
administrative actions assessing disqualifications or overpayment penalties 
that if a claimant makes a claim containing false statements, then the 
Court will find an inherent intent to defraud. Mineer v. Board of Review, 
572 P. 2d 1364, 1366 (Utah 1977), Martinez v. Industrial Commission, 576 
P.2d 1295 (Utah 1978), Millett v. Industrial Commission, 609 P.2d 946 (Utah 
1980), Taylor v. Department of Employment Security, 647 P. 2d 1 (Utah 1982). 
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DES and the Court will find such an intent to defraud regardless of 
the claimant's actual mental state. See, e.g.
 f Diprizio v. Industrial 
Commission, 572 P. 2d 679 (Utah 1977) (Italian immigrant \*/ho failed to 
report earnings because of difficulty with English language assessed 
overpayment penalty); Whitney v. Board of Review, 585 P.2d 780 (Utah 1978) 
(claimant who understated income on grounds of emotional and mental illness 
nevertheless assessed an overpayment penalty); Richmond v. Department of 
Employment Security, 666 P. 2d 313 (Utah 1983) (claimant who was confused 
about vtfiether draws or future commissions constituted compensation assessed 
an overpayment penalty); Slincrer v. Board of Review, 733 P. 2d 122 (Utah 
1987) (claimant who failed to report earnings from National Guard duty 
under self-created mistaken view that such earnings could be averaged over 
the four weeks of a month instead of reported on a weekly basis assessed an 
overpayment penalty). Indeed, the elements of unemployment fraud in the 
administrative arena approach strict liability.1 
1
 A recent case involving a charge of unemployment compensation fraud 
at the administrative level, Mayes v. Department of Employment Security, 
754 P.2d 989 (Utah App. 1988) bears some similarity to the facts of the 
case at hand: 
When plaintiff first filed his claim for unemployment 
insurance benefits, he received a booklet from the Department 
which explained that claimants should fully answer all 
questions on the weekly claim form and indicate all work 
hours and the total amount of earnings for each week. 
Plaintiff also attended an orientation session where he and 
other claimants were advised that they would remain eligible 
for benefits while working on a part-time basis. They were 
told that income from part-time work would reduce their 
unemployment benefits but that they would remain eligible for 
benefits for a longer period of time. Plaintiff claims he 
understood the oral instructions given during the orientation 
meeting to mean that he had the option of reporting or not 
reporting part-time work and earnings. He attributed his 
failure to report work and earnings to his belief that he 
could elect not to report such information. He contends that 
11 
In a prosecution for the crime of unemployment fraud the Utah 
Criminal Code and the fundamental policies behind the statute require 
different elements and a higher standard, A criminal prosecution requires 
proof of a specific and definite mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt. 
III. FRDSECUTTCN FOR THE CRIME OF UNByEPIDYMENT FRAUD REQUIRES 
FRDOF OF THE QJLPABIE MENTAL STATE OF KNOWLEDGE 
The Utah Criminal Code follows the fundamental ccxnmon law principle 
that in order for a person to be found guilty of a criitdnal offense, the 
prosecuting authorities must shew that the accused possessed a certain 
criminal state of mind. § 76-2-102, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
requires that, "Every offense ... shall require a culpable mental state." 
The only exception are crimes involving strict liability, not applicable 
here.2 
this opinion was formed on the basis of information provided 
by a Department representative during the orientation session 
which he and others attended in April 1985. (emphasis added) 
754 P.2d 989,991. 
Based on this opinion, Mayes did not report that he was working 
part-time for a company on any of the claim forms he filed with DES. 
DES assessed Mayes with an overpayment penalty. The Board of Review 
affirmed and Mayes appealed to this Court. 
This Court held the Board of Review had erred in an evidentiary 
ruling, reversed the Board's decision and remanded the case. Thus, this 
Court did not reach the issues at the heart of the Maves case, i.e., 
whether Mayes mistaken view of what he needed to report was a defense to 
the charge. The instant case presents this same issue in the context of a 
criminal proceeding. 
2,,An offense shall involve strict liability if the statute defining 
the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose criminal 
responsibility for conmission of the conduct prohibited by the statute 
without requiring proof of any culpable mental state." (emphasis added) 
§76-2-102, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
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If a person harbors a criminal mental state but does not translate 
that state into a prohibited act there is no crime. Likewise, if a person 
does a wrongful act but without the required mental state, there is no 
crime. State v. Elton, 680 P.2d 727, 728 (Utah 1984). 
The State prosecuted Haws under § 35-4-19 (a), Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended. That statute specifies the mental state necessary for 
conviction of the crime of unemployment fraud. It reads: 
(a) Whoever makes a false statement or 
representation knowing it to be false or knowingly 
fails to disclose a material fact, to obtain or 
increase any benefit or other payment... is guilty 
of a Class A misdemeanor, (emphasis added) 
§35-4-19 does not define the phrases "knc*/ing it to be false" or 
"knowingly fails to disclose a material fact". In fact, the unemployment 
compensation statute does not define those phrases at all. 
§ 76-2-103 of the Utah Criminal Code, hcwever, does define 
"krKSwingly". Presumably, this definition applies to §35-4-19(a). 
According to §76-2-103, a person engages in conduct: 
(2) knowingly, or with knowledge, with 
respect to his conduct or to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct 
when he is aware of the nature of his 
conduct or the existing circumstances. A 
person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, 
with respect to a result of his conduct 
when he is aware that his conduct is 
13 
reasonably certain to cause the result, 
(emphasis added) 
A person acts "with knowledge" or 'Toiowingly" when he aware of the 
nature of his conduct. He must be more than just aware of his conduct. He 
must be aware of the nature of his conduct. If he is not aware that the 
nature of his conduct is of a wrong or cnriminal nature, then he does not 
have the mental state of "knowledge77 and cannot be guilty of an offense 
requiring the existence of that mental state. 
Thus, the presumption in civil unemployment fraud cases that the act 
of making claims containing false statements is inherently fraudulent has 
no place in a prosecution for the crime of unemployment fraud. The 
prosecution must prove the existence of the culpable mental state of 
knowledge in the accused at the time of the culpable act by proof that the 
accused knew he was acting in violation of the law. 
IV. FOR THE PROSECUTION TO HS3VE THAT HAWS HAD 
THE MENS REA OF KNOWLEDGE IT MUST PROVE MDRE THAN JUST WHAT 
ANY CLAIMANT SHOULD HAVE KNOWN, IT MUST PROVE THAT HAWS ACTUALLY 
KNEW HE WAS ACTING IN VIOLATION OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT 
CCMPENSATTON LAW 
In the case at bar, the prosecution argued that on the basis of the 
DES orientation procedure in which Haws participated and the simple 
language of the biweekly claim cards that any claimant should have known to 
report any work and earnings on the biweekly claim cards and therefore Haws 
must have known to report his continuing work at his regular part time job 
and knowingly did not do so. The prosecution's argument found favor with 
the Court, the Court finding that because Haws should have known to report 
his continuing part-time work (regardless of what any departmental 
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representative told him) he did knew and committed fraud. In effect, the 
Court equated what DES believed any claimant should have realized or should 
have been able to understand with what Haws actually did knew and 
understood. This was error. 
What DES believes a claimant should have realized or hew a 
reasonable person objectively should have understood questions on the bi-
weekly claim forms does not qualify as knowledge in terms of a criminal 
statute. What does qualify is what the claimant himself knew and hew he 
subjectively understood a question. To illustrate, Haws refers the Court 
to two civil unemployment fraud cases from other states. 
In Hebert v. State, 323 A.2d 1 (Maine 1974), Hebert became 
unemployed after working for a company for several years. He filed a 
series of claims with the Maine Employment Security Commission. Each claim 
form asked questions concerning the claimant's last or most recent 
employment. After filing the first claim, Hebert worked for a hotel for a 
period of approximately two and one half months. In subsequent claims, he 
did not mention this short term ertployment with the hotel. 
When representatives of the Commission investigated, Hebert 
explained that he understood the question about his last ertployment to be 
referring to his most recent substantial or long term employment, not short 
term work. His explanation did not prevail and the Commission pursued the 
itatter under the state statute which permitted the Commission to disqualify 
an individual from receiving benefits if "the claimant made a false 
statement or representation knowing it to be false or knowingly fails to 
disclose a material fact in his application to obtain benefits". 
Hebert, convinced that he had not made any knowing 
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misrepresentation, pursued the Commission's adverse determination through 
the Commission's appeals machinery, sought review in the local trial court 
(which affirmed the Coramission) and eventually appealed to the Maine 
Supreme Judicial Court. 
The Supreme Judicial Court found the Commission had committed an 
error of law which every level had subsequently ratified: 
The Commission's error of law derives ... frcm 
the Commission's view that under [the statute 
involved] a claimant is accountable on the basis of 
an objective assessment of the meaning of the 
questions posed by the Commission for answer by the 
claimant—i.e., the meaning which a reasonable 
person would assign to the language rather than 
that meaning which the particular claimant in fact 
subjectively understood to be the meaning. 
As the English language is ccammonly used, an 
answer to a question is said to be "false" ... when 
the person who answers subjectively intends 
deception.... 
We are satisfied that in [the statute] the 
Legislature intended precisely this common meaning 
inporting a fully subjective approach to "falsity." 
The conclusion is buttressed by the legislature's 
express requirements that the claimant must "know" 
that his statement is "false" and his "failure to 
disclose a material fact" must be "knowing." 
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Within the correct meaning of [the statute] 
therefore, whether Hebert made a "false statement 
or representation knowing it to be false or 
knowingly failed to disclose a material fact" 
(emphasis supplied) depends. . . on hew Hebert in 
fact subjectively understood the meaning of the 
words used In the Commission's question. Only 
after an evaluation of Hebert's subjective 
apprehension of the meaning of the question can a 
proper determination be made as to whether Hebert's 
answer was "knowingly false"—in the sense that in 
accordance with Hebert/s own special understanding 
of the question, he was subjectively cognizant that 
his answer was contrary to fact, thereby to be a 
deception, a "lie." 
Persistently throughout the evidence Hebert 
asserted that his actual subjective understanding 
of the meaning of the Commission's question was 
that he was being asked to inform the Ccxtimission of 
his most recent substantial employment, the last 
employment at which he had worked "for any 
substantial time." The Commission, however, 
refrained from reaching a decision concerning the 
credit it would give this testimony of Hebert. It 
omitted to make a finding of fact concerning 
whether or not Hebert subjectively understood the 
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question in the manner he was claiming in his 
testimony. Instead, the Commission held such 
finding of fact unnecessary, because irrelevant, on 
the theory that [the statute] rendered Hebert 
chargeable objectively, in terms of a reasonable 
person's understanding of the meaning of the 
question. By this interpretation the Commission 
committed error of law. (emphasis in original and 
added) 
323 A.2d 1 at 6. 
In Meyer v. Skyline Mobile Homes. 99 Idaho 77, 589 P.2d 89 (Idaho 
1979), the State of Idaho's Department of Employment claimed that a 
recipient of unemployment benefits had refused an offer of suitable work 
without good cause and had willfully failed to report a material fact (his 
refusal of the offer) in order to obtain benefits. 
In August of 1975 Meyer had filed for and began receiving 
unemployment benefits. In January or February of 1976, Skyline Mobile 
Homes offered Meyer full-time employment. When Meyer discovered that the 
full-time employment offered would involve heavy traveling, Meyer declined 
the offer. He had earlier worked for Skyline in a job which had involved 
much traveling. Such extended absences had led to a divorce and the loss 
of custody of his two young sons. Fearing the travel would again 
jeopardize a second marriage and family life, Meyer declined Skyline's 
offer. 
As part of the unemployment process, Department of Employment 
("DOE") required Meyer to complete weekly certification forms, one question 
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of which was ''Were you offered any work during the week (either for that 
week or any future date) which you refused?" In corrpleting the DOE's 
weekly certification form for the week of Skyline's offer, Meyer answered 
"no" to the question, 
A DOE claims examiner subsequently determined that Meyer had refused 
an offer of suitable work without good cause and had willfully failed to 
report a material fact in order to obtain benefits and required Meyer to 
repay all the benefits he received as a result of his failure to report the 
Skyline offer. 
Meyer objected to the claims examiner's determination and a DOE 
appeals examiner held a hearing. Meyer indicated that he had not reported 
his refusal of the Skyline offer in response to the question on the weekly 
certification form because he understood the question to ask only whether 
he had refused an offer of suitable work. Meyer testified that he 
considered Skyline's offer of traveling service work unsuitable because 
traveling had destroyed his first marriage and would certainly also disrupt 
his second marriage and prevent him frcm adequately caring for his 
children. 
The DOE appeals examiner determined that Meyer had refused suitable 
work without good cause and had willfully withheld a material fact to 
obtain benefits. Meyer appealed to the Industrial Commission. The 
Industrial Commission affirmed the two earlier decisions. 
Meyer then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court on the ground that he 
did not willfully withhold a material fact. 
The Idaho Supreme Court concluded that the Commission had reached 
its decision under an erroneous view of the law in that it had equated the 
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claimant's gross negligence with the mental state of willfulness. The 
Court reversed the Gammission's determinations: 
Meyer maintained throughout his testimony that ha 
understood the question on the weekly certification 
form to ask whether he had refused an offer of 
suitable work. He explained that he had marked 
"no" because he considered the traveling job with 
Skyline unsuitable in light of his family 
circumstances. 
The examiner's findings reflect that he found 
Meyer's testimony credible. Despite finding that 
Meyer had misunderstood the question on the weekly 
certification form, the examiner concluded that 
Meyer willfully failed to report his refusal of 
work. It seems clear that the appeals examiner 
based his decision not on what Meyer actually 
believed the question asked, but rather on what the 
examiner concluded Meyer should have understood the 
question to ask. 
The court found the Industrial Commission based its 
conclusion [that Meyer willfully withheld material 
information] upon the notion that Meyer must be held 
to knew that which he should have known throuc£i the 
exercise of minimal care. In effect, then, the 
Commission may have assumed that gross negligence on 
Meyer's part [satisfied the willfulness element of 
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the statute.] (emphasis added) 
589 P.2d 89 at 95, 96. 
The Idaho Supreme Court then discussed what meaning should be 
assigned to the word ''willfully'' as used in the statute and concluded that 
the Legislature did not intend to disqualify those vftiose amission is 
accidental "because of negligence, mlsimderstanding or other cause", but 
only intended to disqualify those claimants who "purposely, intentionally, 
consciously, or kncwingly fail to report a material fact". 589 P.2d 89 at 
96. 
In the case at bar, the prosecution attempted to shew that no 
reasonable person would have understood the reporting requirement and the 
questions on the claim cards as Haws did and tried to equate Haws7 lack of 
attention or misunderstanding as knowing failure to disclose material 
facts. But as the courts in the Hebert and Mever cases recognized, the 
fact that a claimant vftio may have lost all work perhaps should have knewn 
to report any new work, whether part-time or full-time, does not 
automatically lead to the conclusion that a claimant in Haws' situation 
should have known to report his ongoing part-time work or Haws himself 
actually knew to report his regular ongoing part-time work and failed to do 
so. Ihe State presented little evidence as to Haws7 actual state of mind. 
But Haws explained that he was mistaken. Haws7 testimony was that because 
of his employment situation and his conversation with the DES 
representative, he subjectively understood the process of reporting to 
require him to report any new work he obtained but not the continuing work 
at his part time job of which DES was aware and vrtiich he had been lead to 
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believe was already being considered in his benefit amount. 
V. FOR THE HtoSECOTION TO PROVE THAT HAWS HAD THE MENS REA OF 
KNOWLEDGE, IT MUST PROVE MORE THAN THAT HAWS ENGAGED IN AN ACIJ 
IT MUST PROVE THAT HAWS KNEW THAT HE WAS ACTING IN VIOIATICN 
OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT IAW 
Haws7 research has uncovered no Utah case which discusses what is 
required to establish proof of the mental state of 'ToTewingly'' or "with 
knowledge" in the context of a criminal prosecution under §35-4-19(a)4. 
States with similar unemployment compensation laws, however, have 
interpreted their laws to require that similar mental states be proven by 
more than just proof of the commission of a fraudulent act. 
For example, in Division of Employment & Trainincr v. Industrial 
Commission of Colorado, 706 P.2d 433 (Colo. App. 1985), a civil case, the 
3
 The Unemployment Insurance Claimant Guide may possibly contribute to 
such a mistaken understanding. The Claimant Guide presupposes that one 
filing for unemployment benefits is not employed at all. See, for example, 
page 5: "It is to your advantage to accept all work you can find while 
filing a claim. You can earn up to 30% of your weekly benefit amount 
before any deduction will be made frcm your weekly check. All earnings 
must be reported on the bi-weekly claim form even if the total is less than 
30% of your weekly benefit amount. If you accept part-time work you must 
continue to demonstrate your availability for full-time work by making an 
active work search each week." (emphasis added) 
The Claimant Guide does not directly address the situation of 
someone in Mr. Haws7 situation, who at the time he applies for benefits is 
still working part-time. Given that ambiguity, it is certainly conceivable 
that someone who files for unemployment benefits and who tells DES he is 
still working part-time and who is told that the earnings therefrom will be 
factored into his benefit amount, might conclude that he need not report 
his ongoing work but need only report any other work, which is exactly vrtiat 
Haws concluded and what he did. 
4
 Haws is informed that the great majority of prosecutions under § 35-
4-19 (a) are plea bargained. This may help explain the apparent dearth of 
cases addressing the issues in this brief. 
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claimant had filled out an unemployment compensation form on a Thursday and 
mailed it the following Sunday. During the intervening period, the 
claimant had worked on a teitporary basis for his former employer. He had 
not amended the unemployment compensation form to shew this work or the 
earnings therefrom. 
When the Division discovered this failure to report it assessed the 
claimant an overpayment penalty and a monetary fine. The claimant appealed 
to the Industrial Commission which allowed collection of the overpayment 
but disallowed the fine on the ground that the Division had to prove the 
claimant's specific intent and had not done so. 
The Division appealed, arguing it did not have to prove a culpable 
mental state but only had to prove the act of making a false representation 
or failure to disclose a material fact. 
The Colorado Court of Appeals disagreed. The Court held that 
statute implied a mental state of knowledge. The Court also held that 
specific proof of the mental state was required: 
[W]e conclude that the culpable mental state which must 
be established by the Division pursuant to [the 
statute] is //kncwinglyl#. A person acts ,#knowingly,# 
with respect to the proscribed conduct "when he is 
aware that his conduct is of such nature," and a 
person acts //knewir*gly" with respect to a result of 
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is 
practically certain to cause the result. 
[W]e do not agree . . . that the requisite culpable 
mental state may be presumed from proof of the act 
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itself. Where, as here, proscribed conduct 
consists of an act combined with a culpable mental 
state, the culpable mental state is just as much an 
element of the proscribed conduct as is the act. 
Although a culpable mental state may ordinarily be 
inferred from circumstantial evidence, proof of the 
commission of the act does not create a presumption 
that the requisite mental state existed. 
(emphasis added) 
706 P. 2d 433 at 435. 
Other states have interpreted their criminal unemployment fraud laws 
to require proof of some element of intent and knowledge on the part of the 
accused. For example, the California Unemployment Insurance Code provides: 
(a) It is a misdemeanor to willfully make a false 
statement or representation or knowingly fail to 
disclose a material fact to obtain, increase, 
reduce or defeat any benefit or payment... 
One of the issues in People v. Louie, 158 Cal. App. 3d Supp.28, 205 
Cal. Rptr. 247 (Cal. Sup. 1984), was what the prosecution was required to 
prove to establish a violation of this section of the statute. 
In Louie, the State had charged a medical doctor with violating the 
above referenced section of the unemployment code. A special investigator 
working undercover had tried to get the doctor to sign a form certifying 
him as disabled. The doctor eventually signed three such forms, but only 
after extreme behavior by the undercover officer which convinced the doctor 
that something was wrong with the man and that it would be in the man's 
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best interests to have him certified with a disability. The court held 
"the prosecution must prove two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) an 
intent to defraud and (2) the willful making of a false statement or 
representation." The court also held that if the accused acted without an 
intent to defraud but in the good faith belief that his conduct was 
justified, such would constitute a defense to the intent to defraud 
element. The court determined the trial court had failed to instruct the 
jury that if the defendant possessed a good faith belief in the man's 
disability he was not acting with the requisite intent to defraud and 
reversed the conviction: 
The evidence at bench does not point irresistibly 
to the conclusion that appellant acted with the 
required fraudulent intent. Under proper 
instructions the jury could well have reasonably 
acquitted him on the evidence presented. 
205 Cal. Rptr. 247 at 258, 260. 
States have also addressed the meaning of |yknowring,/ in the context 
of administrative or criminal prosecutions for violation of laws 
establishing other social welfare programs. In Krauzer v. Farmland 
Industries. 626 P. 2d 1223 (Kan App. 1981), for example, the issue was what 
the prosecution had to prove to make out a case of fraud in a state 
workers' compensation program. 
The question before the court is simply, did 
Mr. Krauzer knowingly misrepresent his physical 
condition to Farmland? 
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It is inherent in the term 'Tmcwingly" that some 
degree of awareness be present. Under the statute 
a person who misrepresents the condition of his 
health solely by reason of accident or mistake and 
without any awareness that he has done so cannot be 
said to have knowingly made the misrepresentation, 
(emphasis added) 
626 P.2d 1223 at 1225, 1229. 
See also United States v. Marvin, 687 F.2d 1221 (8th Cir. 1982), in 
which the meaning of 'Tmewing'' was presented in the context of a 
prosecution for the crime of fraudulently obtaining food staitps: 
Defendant contends. • . that the word 'Tmowingly* 
in [the statute] required the government to prove 
that he knew that his actions were in violation of 
the law. We must agree. 
• • • . 
The normal purpose of the criminal law is to 
condemn and punish conduct that society regards as 
immoral. Usually the stigma of criminal conviction 
is not visited upon citizens who are not morally to 
blame because they did not know they were doing 
wrong. 
• . . . 
Mthough the legislative history of [the statute] 
is far from extensive, there is sufficient evidence 
to suggest that Congress desired that no one be 
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convicted of violating this section without proof 
that he knew the unlawful character of his act. 
. . . . 
The District Court correctly stated in its 
instructions that the purpose of including the word 
,/knowingly// in [the statute] is "to insure that no 
one will be convicted for an act done because of 
mistake, or accident, or other innocent reason." 
. . . . 
This does not mean that the defendant must know, by 
chapter and verse, the precise law and regulation 
that forbid trafficking in food stamps for cash. 
But he most knew that he was acting in violation of 
some law or regulation. 
. . . . 
[U]nder the instructions given the jury was 
permitted to convict, and could have done so 
without finding that vtfien defendant bought food 
staitps on the occasion charged in Count I, he knew 
he was doing something that the law had forbidden. 
The conviction on Count I must therefore be 
reversed, (emphasis added) 
687 F.2d 1221 at 1225, 1226, 1227, 1228. 
In the case at bar, Haws' explanation as to his subjective 
understanding of what he was supposed to do based on his conversation with 
a DES representative to do went uncontroverted. The trial court refrained 
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from making any finding as to \diether it believed Haws7 explanation and 
testimony, yet the Court found Haws guilty. This was error. 
Haws was mistaken. He subjectively understood the question, "Did 
you work?" to mean "Did you work on any job other than the part-time work 
which the DES ccatputer already shews you working?" Haws' mistaken 
imderstanding was not created by Haws out of thin air. It resulted from a 
conversation between Haws and a Department representative. Maybe the 
representative misunderstood Haws7 question. Maybe Haws misunderstood the 
representative's answer. But there was no evidence to indicate that Haws 
actually knew to report his part-time work and failed to do so. 
Thus, in the case at bar, the evidence is insufficient to establish 
that Haws actually knew that he was to report his regular ongoing part-time 
work to DES. The evidence universally points to the conclusion that Haws 
was mistaken, the victim of misunderstanding or miscoDnraunication, on the 
part of the Departmental representative or Haws or both. This 
misunderstanding does not qualify as the required mens rea.5 
5
 The view of the law which Haws proposes is not an invitation for 
deliberate carelessness on the part of claimants nor an onerous obstacle in 
the path of the prosecutor. As the Supreme Court of Idaho took pains to 
elucidate in Meyer, supra, a claimant's mere assertion that there was a 
caramunication gap of some kind should not preclude a finding upon 
satisfactory evidence that a claimant did in fact willfully (or knewingly) 
make a false statement or representation or willfully (or knewingly) fail 
to report a material fact in order to obtain benefits. For exaitple, if a 
claimant knew or thought it highly probable that he or she did not knew 
what information a claim form question solicited but nevertheless 
deliberately chose to respond without pursuing clarification such conduct 
mic£it support a conclusion of willful falsehood or concealment. Or if the 
claimant's explanation is inconsistent with his behavior, wildly improbable 
or otherwise unworthy of belief, the fact finder may still find knowing 
deception. 
But itdscoranunication and mistakes do occur. To saddle someone with 
a criminal record solely on the basis of a mistaken view of his 
responsibilities based on a miscommunication or misunderstanding where 
there was no proof of an intent to defraud and no knowledge as to the 
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OONCXUSION 
The trial court's verdict was clearly erroneous. The trial court 
held an erroneous view of What evidence could establish the presence of the 
requisite mental state. That erroneous view resulted in Haws' conviction 
on less than adequate evidence. A mistake has been made. The State did 
not establish that Haws actually knew to report his ongoing part-time work 
at Bonneville Estates on the biweekly claim cards and knowingly did not do 
so, by adequate evidence. Thus, the State did not satisfy the requirements 
of §35-4-19 and the elements of the crime. Accordingly, the current 
conviction of Mr. Haws cannot stand and should be overturned. 
Dated this Crfe —day of May, 1989. 
ROMNEY & OONDIE 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
criminal nature of his conduct is not just. 
See also § 76-2-304, Utah Code Annotated, as amended: 
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of fact 
which disproves the culpable mental state is a defense to any 
prosecution for that crime, (emphasis added) 
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ADDENDUM TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
A-l Resmarks and Decision of Judge Gowans in declaring the verdict. 
A-2 Ihe Judgment sought to be reviewed. 
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GLENN R. HAWS, 
Defendant. 
-oOo-
Criminal No. 881010137MS 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 6th day of January, 1989, 
the above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Floyd H. Gowans, sitting as Judge in the above-named 
Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the following 
proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
10 WEST BROADWAY. SUITE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101 
1
 I P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 
3
 • THE COURT: Mr. Haws? 
* Mr. Haws, the Court has had an opportunity to review 
5
 all the documents that have been submitted as evidence and 
6
 I reviewed the other matters which have been provided for the 
Court, and while the arguments as propounded by your attorney 
8
 are certainly appropriate and correct, and that is that there 
9
 J must be some—or the appropriate mental state; the Court feels, 
after reviewing these documents, that you had access to and were 
11
 exposed to that you should have had that complete understanding, 
12
 J irrespective of what any individual may have said to you during 
the course of your dealings with the Department. 
Specifically, on Page 5, and let me just read that to 
you: It is to your advantage to accept all work you can find 







 j weekly benefit amount, before any deduction will be made from 
18
 I your weekly check. And then this phrase, and the word "all" is 
19
 I in capitals, so that it's very apparent in the paragraph. ALL 
earnings must be reported on a bi-weekly claim form, even if the 20 
21
 total is less than the 30 percent of your weekly benefit amount. 
22
 And then further on in the booklet, back on Page 21, 
23
 penalties for fraudulent claims. The paragraph reads as follows: 
24
 it is a crime to misrepresent or withhold information to obtain 
25
 unemployment benefits. Now, whether there was some miscommunicatic| 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
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SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101 
1
 I between you and this person, either on your part or on her part, 
2
 • of course, the Court cannot answer, but it would appear the things 
3
 that you had been exposed to in this booklet, and there's another 
* phrase I wanted to read, and I think I jotted that down, let m e — 
5
 yes, on Page 1, the very first paragraph. This guide provides 
6
 information you are required to know about your rights and 
7
 responsibilities while filing a claim. 
8
 Even after your discussions with individuals, with this 
9
 I individual, assuming all of that to be correct, and this person 





 J or considered or evaluated in the benefit that you were receiving, 
12
 I it would appear from these three entries that the Court has read 
13
 from this booklet, that it would have—or should have been 
14
 perfectly clear to you that you must report that information for 
15
 future consideration. 
16
 And then as you would sign for your checks each week, 
*
7
 I on this claim form, as was pointed out during the course of the 
proceedings, it is very specific again; number one, did you work, 
and then if the answer to that is yes, then you must indicate 
whether it was full-time, part-time, on call, et cetera, et cetera, 
21
 I The Court does not find, Mr. Haws, that there could 
22
 have been any misunderstanding from these printed documents as to 
23
 what your requirements are. Consequently, the Court finds you 
24
 guilty as charged. 
25
 I Now, Mr. Holdsworth, would you wish the Court to impose 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
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10 
1
 sentence at this time or at a later date, and would you wish a 
2
 pre-sentence report? 
3
 MR. HOLDSWORTH: I would like a pre-sentence report. 
• THE COURT: All right. 
5
 MR. HOLDSWORTH: And have sentencing at a later time. 
6
 THE COURT: All right. We'll continue the matter then 
7
 for sentencing, that second week into February, Marlene, what date 
8
 are we using there, the 7th or 9th? 
9
 I THE CLERK: The 8th. 
THE COURT: The 8th? All right. Sentencing then 
H February 8th, at 9:30 in the morning. What kind of calendar is 
12 that? 
13 THE CLERK: DUI, 
14 THE COURT: Okay. At 9:30 in the morning. 
15
 And Mr. Haws, my clerk will give to you a slip of paper 
16
 which will direct you to the probation department. Follow the 
17 instructions on that paper , and then be back in my courtroom on 
18 February 8th at 9:30. All right. Thank you. A P & P, Yes. 
19 (Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
20 
21 
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A-2 
JUD3ENT SOUGHT TO EE REVIEWED 
iniy ui OCLK uaNtf j&a. 
the undersigned, Clerk of the Circuit Co' Stale of 
ht Salt UKC County. Salt Lake Department do hereby 
ify that the an.w»xed ana foregoing ic a true and UM 
y of an original document on file in my office as tucH 
/ i tnefi£"mylVcl/^d^§a! df^spd gourt This T J ^ L 
PAUL L VANCE, Clecj 
Deputy 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
GLEN R. HAWS, 
Defendant, 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
Case No. 881007904MS 
DOB 5/18/54 
On January 3, 1989, before the Honorable Floyd H. Gowans, 
appeared John Spikes, the attorney for the state and the 
defendant appeared in person and by counsel, David J. 
Holdsworth. 
A bench trial was held and the case was taken under 
advisement. 
On January 6, 1989, the defendant was found guilty of 
unemployment compensation fraud. 
It is adjudged that the defendant is guilty of the offense 
of unemployment compensation fraud and was sentenced February 
8, 1989, as follows: 
90 days jail, to be stayed on good behavior probation of 1 
year; terms: 
1. No further violations. 
2. Continue on payment schedule to employment security 
and remain current. 
3. Report for booking process, then released. 
4. Pay $250.00 fine by April 28, 1989. Fine may be 
worked off. 
(li{l¥-DATED this Z | day of (U'UV— -r 1989/ 
BY THE COURT 
JUDGE, 
